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Finding Our Way: Secured Transactions and Corporate Bankruptcy Law and Policy in America and 
England* 
I Introduction 
This article is about the way in which England and America have historically sought to balance two 
sets of policy considerations, and the implications of the evolutionary history for current reform 
debates.  The first set of policy concerns is those relating to the ability of a debtor to grant security 
over its assets, in order to promote the availability and affordability of capital for healthy companies 
in the economy.   There is a voluminous literature on the theoretical case for secured credit,1 but in 
practice most developed economies accept that secured transactions law plays some part in 
promoting the availability and pricing of credit.  The second set of policy concerns is those relating to 
the availability of assets to meet the claims of unsecured creditors, and to fund the corporate 
bankruptcy case, when a company fails. 
The organising principle at the heart of the article is that English courts and US courts answered a 
foundational question about the scope of security in almost diametrically opposed ways in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, with the result that the legislature in each jurisdiction has 
been concerned with different sets of policy considerations for most of the rest of the twentieth 
century and into the twenty-first century.  The article suggests that this has explanatory power when 
we examine current debates on reform of secured creditor priority in England and the US.  On the 
one hand, in the late nineteenth century the English courts supported the development of security 
interests which enabled all or substantially all of the debtor's assets to be secured, with the result 
that legislative reform efforts over the next century and a half focused on corporate bankruptcy 
policy concerns which arose where the debtor had no unencumbered assets, leading to a complex 
regime for secured creditor priority in corporate bankruptcy.  On the other hand, US courts reached 
determinations which made it very challenging for a lender to have a "blanket lien" over all of the 
debtor's assets, so that reform efforts over the next century and a half focused on the ability of the 
lender to take and perfect security over a wide range of asset types in order to support secured 
transaction policy concerns for the availability and cost of credit in the "healthy" economy.  At the 
same time, the availability of unencumbered assets in the estate meant that no particular need to 
redistribute assets from the secured creditor to other creditors or to fund the case arose.   Complex 
institutional structures emerged in both jurisdictions which contributed to the way in which the two 
                                                            
** Sarah Paterson, Associate Professor of Law, the London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Houghton Street, London WC1A 2AE. Telephone: 0207 106 1244.  E-mail:  S.Paterson@lse.ac.uk. 
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inquiry, notably Louise Gullifer and Hugh Beale.  The author is also grateful to Adrian Walters, Steve Harris and 
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1 See, for example, T. Jackson and A. Kronman, 'Secured Financing and Priorities Affecting Creditors' (1979) 88 
Yale LJ 1143; A. Schwarz, 'Security Interests and Bankruptcy Policies: A Review of Current Theories' (1981) 10 J. 
Legal Studies 1; R.E. Scott, 'A Relational Theory of Secured Financing' 86 Columb. L. Rev 901; P.E. Shipak, 
'Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions' 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 1067; George G. Triantis, 'Secured Debt Under 
Conditions of Imperfect Information' 21 J. Legal Stud. 225; H. Kanda and S. Leumore, 'Explaining Creditor 
Priorities' 80 Va. L. Rev. 2103; L.M. LoPucki, 'The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain' (1994) 80 Va. L. Rev. 1887; S.L. 
Harris and C.W. Mooney J., 'A Property-Based Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtor's Choices Seriously' 
(1994) 2021, 2047-2053 and L. Bebchuk and J.M. Fried, 'The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy' (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 857.   
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sets of policy concerns were balanced.  In England, secured creditors and the courts supported the 
role of the insolvency practitioner as a crucial source of power to mediate the blunt edges of the 
inroads into secured creditor power in the corporate bankruptcy statute, whilst  in the US the 
bankruptcy court emerged as a powerful institution with the willingness and capacity to support 
corporate bankruptcy law’s policy objectives where it considered  it necessary in the interests of the 
bankruptcy case, notwithstanding the rather blunt rules of priority in the US Bankruptcy Code.   
The article argues that the evolutionary story explains the nature of the current debate on the case 
for reform on both sides of the Atlantic.  In England, the debate principally centres on whether the 
legislative inroads into secured creditor priority in corporate bankruptcy have gone too far, affecting 
the availability and cost of capital for healthy companies in the economy.  In the US, the debate 
principally centres on whether the reforms to secured transactions law have gone too far, so that 
secured creditors wield unprecedented power in the corporate bankruptcy case affecting the 
availability of returns for unsecured creditors, with wider consequences for the economy, and the 
availability of funding to meet the expenses of the case.  The evolutionary history reveals that 
neither England nor America has taken one side of the theoretical debate or the other.  When we 
look at the whole picture we see that, although each jurisdiction set off along its journey towards 
balancing the concerns from opposite ends of the telescope, there has been a continuous process in 
both jurisdictions of adjustments and readjustments to the balance struck between the two sets of 
policy objectives, supported by a complex institutional architecture which has developed along the 
way.  This leads to the final part of the article which makes some tentative predictions for future 
developments.  Drawing on the theory of path dependence, it suggests that there are reasons to 
doubt that the current reform debate will lead to a radical overhaul of either system, at least in the 
reasonably forseeable future.  However, it suggests that there are comparatively modest reforms 
which could nonetheless continue the process of balancing the policy objectives, embedded in, and 
adjusted to, local institutional structures. 
One last point on terminology: English law typically draws a distinction between bankruptcy, which 
relates to individuals, and insolvency, which relates to corporates, whilst that distinction is not 
drawn in the US.  For ease of reference, this article uses “corporate bankruptcy” as a generic term 
applying to both jurisdictions. 
II The Foundational Question, the English Answer and Corporate Bankruptcy Policy Concerns 
In 1870 the English Court of Appeal determined that where a company charged its “undertaking and 
all sums of money arising therefrom” the word “undertaking” captured all present and future 
property of the company,2  effectively recognising the ability of the secured creditor to bring all of 
the property and assets of the company within the scope of the security package.  A conceptual 
problem remained with a fixed charge over all of the company’s undertaking because it was an 
incidence of a fixed charge that the chargee’s consent was required for any disposals (so that such 
an all-encompassing charge would paralyse the business).3  This was first dealt with by transactional 
lawyers who included an express right to deal with the charged assets in the ordinary course of 
business until default, winding up or cessation of business where the charge was over all of the 
company’s undertaking present and future.  In time, such a term was implied by the courts into such 
                                                            
2 Re Panama New Zealand and Australian Royal Mail Co (1869-70) LR Ch App 318 
3 J. Armour, ‘The Chequered History of the Floating Charge’ (2004) 13 Griffith L. Rev. 25, 27; G. Moss, ‘Fictions 
and Floating Charges: Some Reflections on the House of Lords’ Decision in Spectrum’, 2 in J. Getzler and J. 
Payne (eds) Company Charges: Spectrum and Beyond (OUP 2006) 
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charges and they gradually became known as “floating charges”.4   Thus, by the end of the 
nineteenth century the ability of a lender to take security over all or substantially all of the assets of 
an English company with comparative ease was well-established in law.   This gave rise to several 
policy considerations familiar to corporate bankruptcy lawyers. First, there is the policy question of 
whether other classes of creditor are adequately protected in the corporate bankruptcy regime.  
Secondly, there is the policy consideration of whether secured creditors have achieved gains at the 
expense of unsecured creditors.  Third, there is the policy question of whether there will be 
adequate financing for a bankruptcy case in order to hold those responsible to account, where 
appropriate, and to maximise returns for creditors as a whole.  Not surprisingly, having answered 
the foundational question in favour of the secured creditor we find all of these corporate bankruptcy 
policy considerations firmly on the legislative agenda for the rest of the century and into the next. 
The role of corporate bankruptcy law in redistributing proceeds from creditors who benefit from 
bargained-for security to other creditor classes is heavily contested by corporate bankruptcy law 
theorists,5 but, in England, Parliament has worried from early in the history of corporate bankruptcy 
that no assets will be available in insolvency for creditors which it wishes, as a matter of policy, to 
protect.  Of course, given the ability of the secured creditor to take security over all or substantially 
all of the debtor’s assets through a combination of fixed and floating charges, this is a very real 
concern.  Thus, the Companies Act 1883 provided that certain unpaid wages and salaries  should be 
paid before all other debts in the distribution of the assets of a company being wound up,6 and the 
categories of preferential debts were widened to include  rates and certain unpaid taxes by the 
Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act 1888.7 In Richard v Overseers of Kidderminster it was held 
that the preferential status of overseers of the poor did not trump secured creditors who were not 
claiming as creditors in the winding up. 8  As a result, preferred creditors identified in the Preferential 
Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1897 were afforded priority over debenture holders,9 and 
section 264 of the Companies Act 1929 made clear that, where the debenture created both fixed 
and floating charges, only assets subject to the floating charge were subordinated to the preferential 
debts.10 
Financiers responded to the challenge.  In In re Griffin Hotel the debenture holder appointed a 
receiver with the result that its floating charge crystallised and became fixed.11  The court held that, 
as the charge had crystallised by the appointment of the receiver, section 264 of the Companies Act 
1929 (which applied only if there was a charge which was still floating at the moment of winding up) 
had no operation and there was nothing for the priority of the preferential debts to bite on. 
Parliament responded in its turn and the Insolvency Act 1985 fixed the problem by defining a 
floating charge as a charge which "as created" was a floating charge. Thenceforth the floating charge 
would be identified at the end of its life by the character which it had had at its birth, so that the 
trick in Re Griffin Hotel was consigned to the history books. 
                                                            
4 Armour, ‘The Chequered History of the Floating Charge’ ibid, 28 
5 For a non-distributional role see T.H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (Harvard University 
Press 1986); for the case for redistribution see E Warren, ‘Bankruptcy Policy’ (1987) 54 The University of 
Chicago Law Review 775 
6 The Companies Act 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 28), s. 4 
7 51 & 52 Vict. c.62 
8 Richard v Overseers of Kidderminster; Richards v Mayor of Kidderminster [1896] 2 Ch 212 
9 Although not with retrospective effect; see In re Waverley Type Writer; D’Esterre v Waverley Type Writer 
[1897 w. 1598] [1898] 1 Ch 699 
10 In re Lewis Merthyr Consolidated Collieries Limited [1928 L 281]; [1929] 1 Ch 498 
11 In re Griffin Hotel Company, Limited [1938] G 2627; [1941] Ch 129 
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Still, the types of debt which ranked as preferential debts ebbed and flowed with the political and 
economic climate.  For example, certain rates were preferential debts in bankruptcy until the 
Insolvency Act 1986,12 and  by far and away the most significant of the categories of preferential 
debt which remained after the Insolvency Act 1986 were the monies owed to the Inland Revenue for 
certain taxes and social security contributions.  Allowing for the expenses of the insolvency office 
holder (discussed below), it was common for the preferential debts to absorb the entire balance of 
the estate.13  The normative basis of this priority for the State was also contentious,14 and crown 
preference was eventually abolished by the Enterprise Act 2002.15 The point, put shortly, is that 
against a background of easily perfected security over all of the assets of a debtor, considerable 
legislative attention has been paid to the question of adequate provision for other creditors which 
Parliament has determined, from time to time, it wishes to protect as a matter of corporate 
bankruptcy policy. 
This provision for payments to so-called preferential creditors gives rise to a second persistent 
corporate bankruptcy policy concern in an environment of the  all-encompassing security interest: 
that once the preferential and secured creditors have been paid in full, nothing will be left for other 
unsecured creditors.  From quite early in the history of the floating charge, the English courts show 
concern for the problem of scope; a concern that the gains to the secured and preferential creditors 
are achieved at the expense of loss to the other creditors.  Parliament sought to alleviate the 
perceived unfairness by a new system for registration of company charges,16 but it was widely 
understood that there were limitations on the trade creditor's ability to search the register every 
time she transacted with the company, a limited range of options for the trade creditor even if she 
did search and always the possibility that another creditor would take security after the search had 
been completed. 
In order to deal with this corporate bankruptcy policy concern, Professor Roy Goode apparently 
brought the idea of "carving out" a portion of the secured assets, and making them available to the 
unsecured creditors, to the attention of one of the members of the Cork Committee when they were 
comprehensively reviewing English insolvency law,17  and the Committee did recommend that 
holders of floating charges give up ten per cent of their realisations to enable the money to be 
distributed among unsecured creditors.18  Although the recommendation was not enacted, it came 
back onto the Parliamentary agenda in the late 1990s when it became clear that the government of 
the day might be prepared to review the Crown's preferential status on insolvency.  If Crown 
preference were abolished without any amendment to the priority rules on insolvency it would 
essentially produce a windfall for the floating charge holders.  As a result, the Enterprise Act 2002 
reforms to the Insolvency Act 1986 did implement the abolition of crown preference, but introduced 
a "prescribed part" to be carved out of secured creditor receipts for the benefit of unsecured 
creditors, sized as a proxy for the preferential status which was being surrendered by the Crown.19   
The English courts have recognised the legislative intent to create a fund for unsecured creditors, 
and have resisted attempts by secured creditors to share in the prescribed part unless they go so far 
                                                            
12 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 386 and Sch. 6 
13 See, for example, Re Pearl Maintenance Services Ltd [1995] BCC 657 
14 S.J. Cantlie, ‘Preferred Priority in Bankruptcy’ in J.S. Ziegel (ed), Current Developments in International and 
Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law (Clarendon Press 1994) 
15 Enterprise Act 2002, s. 251 
16 Companies Act 1900 
17 R. Goode, ‘The Case for the Abolition of the Floating Charge’, at fn 7 in Getzler and Payne (n 3) 
18 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558 1982), 1538-1549 
19 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 176A(3)(a) and the Insolvency Act 1986 (Prescribed Part) Order 2003 
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as to surrender their security.20   In other words, both the legislature and the courts have worked to 
implement the prescribed part as a response to corporate bankruptcy policy’s concern for unsecured 
creditors, particularly where secured creditors are able to take security over the entire estate with 
relative ease. 
As the comprehensive security package developed in the English market, a further corporate 
bankruptcy policy concern has been how the costs and expenses of the winding up are to be met.  
The corporate bankruptcy policy concern is, of course, that if all the assets are effectively secured 
then, first, there will be no source of payment for costs and expenses, so that unviable companies 
will simply disappear from the register, and directors and others involved in the management of the 
company will avoid actions which should be taken against them for the benefit of creditors (and, 
perhaps, in the public interest)  and, secondly, recovery-maximising possibilities may be closed off.  
In 1970, the English Court of Appeal held that the expenses of the liquidation ranked ahead of the 
floating charge holder’s claim,21 and it appears that the Enterprise Act 2002 was drafted on the basis 
that that case was correctly decided, so that the amendments made to the Insolvency Act 1986 
clearly subordinated floating charges to the cost of administration proceedings (discussed below).22  
However, in Buchler v Talbot the House of Lords conducted a thorough review of the statutory 
history and the case law,23 and determined that the costs and expenses of the liquidation were not 
payable out of floating charge property.  Parliament responded swiftly, and section 1282 of the 
Companies Act 2006 inserted a new section 176ZA into the Insolvency Act 1986 overturning the 
decision.24  Thus corporate bankruptcy policy’s third concern was met in an environment of fully 
secured lending. 
A further corporate bankruptcy policy concern which arises in an environment in which a creditor 
may have security over all or substantially all of the debtor’s assets is how further funding can be 
raised for the corporate bankruptcy case, in order to pursue strategies which may be value-
maximising for all creditors, if there are no free assets to offer as security.  Under paragraph 99(4) of 
Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 a sum payable in respect of a debt or liability arising out of a 
contract entered into by the administrator or a predecessor before cessation is payable in priority to 
property subject to the floating charge.  This suggests that any loan agreement which the 
administrator enters into will rank above the floating charge in corporate bankruptcy's distributional 
order of priority.  Under paragraph 59(1) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986, the 
administrator may do "anything necessary or expedient for the management of the affairs, business 
and property of the company", and Schedule 1 paragraph 3 expressly provides that the 
administrator has power "to raise or borrow money and grant security therefor over the property of 
the company."  Putting this together, and recognising that the position is relatively untested, there is 
a good argument that the legislature is alive to this issue, and that the administrator has power to 
enter into a new financing agreement  which would rank ahead of property subject to a floating 
                                                            
20 Re JT Frith Ltd [2012] BCC 634, 639; In re Airbase Services (UK) Ltd [2008] EWHC 124 (Ch); [2008] 1 WLR. 
1516, 1521-22; Re Permacell Finesse Ltd (in liq.) [2007] EWHC 3233 (Ch); [2008] B.C.C 208, 211 
21 Re Barleycorn Enterprises Ltd; Mathias and Davies (A Firm) v Down [1970] 2 WLR 898; [1970] Ch 465 
22 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para. 99.  For a discussion, see J. Armour, 'Floating Charges: All Adrift?' (2004) 
63(3) CLJ 560 
23 Buchler v Talbot[2004] UKHL 9; [2004] 2 AC 298 
24 Subsequently, steps were taken to ensure that one of the perceived inequities of the Barleycorn position, 
that a liquidator might take the costs of unsuccessful litigation out of the floating charge assets, even where 
the floating charge holder had objected to the litigation, was corrected through the introduction of detailed 
provisions demanding floating charge holder consultation 
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charge (although not property subject to a fixed charge).  There is also some scholarly support for 
this analysis.25    
It must be acknowledged that there is some debate around the impact of any negative pledge clause 
in pre-administration loans for this analysis.  It is suggested that provided the administrator 
considers it is in the interests of the creditors as a whole that the new financing is obtained, and that 
the existing lenders have shown themselves unwilling to provide it on equal terms, the court should 
be able to come to her aid on issues of the negative pledge in pre-administration financing on an 
application for court directions.26   First, paragraph 99(5) of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 
gives rise to a statutory charge over the assets which may not be caught by the negative pledge.  
Secondly, the administrator acts as agent of the company and may be protected by the rule in Said v 
Butt from a claim for inducing a breach of contract.27 Finally, if neither of these routes assists, the 
defence of justification should be available to both the administrator and the company in 
administration.28   
More straightforwardly, paragraph 70 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986 expressly provides 
that the administrator may "dispose of or take action relating to property which is subject to a 
floating charge as if it were not subject to the charge."  Crucially, to the extent that the estate 
comprises cash at bank which is subject to a floating charge, the administrator will be able to use 
that cash to fund the administration case without the consent of the floating charge holder or the 
court (notwithstanding that the floating charge holder will have "the same priority in respect of 
acquired property as he had in respect of the property disposed of").29   In other words, when we 
look at the distributional scheme in the English Insolvency Act arguably Parliament is alert to the 
problem of funding the corporate bankruptcy case in the absence of free assets. 
The English courts have also shown themselves ready and willing to support the legislature’s scheme 
for protecting and promoting corporate bankruptcy policy’s concerns.  Perhaps not surprisingly, 
given that all of the innovations we have considered thus far apply to the floating charge and not the 
fixed charge, financiers in England have actively sought to bring as much of their security package 
within fixed charges as possible.  In determining whether security was fixed or floating, early cases 
focused on the ability of the chargee to prevent dealings with the charged property in the course of 
the business as a going concern.30  The first innovation from the finance industry arose in this 
context where the bank took a charge over its customer's account.  In Siebe Gorman the bank 
required the debtor to pay collections into an account with the bank, and the court was content to 
classify the charge as a fixed charge.31  But this route was available only to a bank creditor, and not a 
non-bank creditor who could not take charge of collections. Thus, in Re Brightlife, Hoffman J (as he 
then was) held that although a debenture purported to create a "first specific charge" over the book 
and other debts, in reality the charge amounted to a floating charge since Brightlife was free to 
                                                            
25 P.R. Wood, 'Fixed and Floating Charges' (2001) 60(3) CLJ, 472-474;  V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: 
Perspectives and Principles (CUP 2009 2nd ed),  409-410; G, McCormack, ‘Super-priority New Financing and 
Corporate Rescue’ (2007) JBL 701, 728 
26 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch. B1 para. 63 
27 Lictor Anstalt v Mir Steel UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 3310 (Ch); [2012] Bus LR D84 (but see also SCI Games Ltd v 
Argonaut Games Plc [2005] EWHC 1403 (Ch); 2005 WL 165 0621 and views expressed by G. Lightman and G. 
Moss, The Law of Administrators and Receivers of Companies (OUP 2011 5th ed), 370-371) 
28 See Lightman and Moss ibid., 371 
29 Insolvency Act 1986 Sch. B1, para. 70(2) 
30 In re Horne and Hollard 22 April 1885 [1885 E 50] (1885) LR 29 Ch D 736; Benton v Electrical Engineering 
[1891 B. 1055] [1892] 1 Ch 434; Robson v Smith [1894 R 1267]; [1895] 2 Ch 118 
31 Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1979] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 142 
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collect its debts and pay the proceeds into its bank account at which point they fell outside the 
charge over debts and the company was free to dispose of them as it wished.  This right to deal with 
the charged assets for the company's own account was a "badge of a floating charge" and was 
inconsistent with a fixed charge, and a prohibition against factoring of the debts was not sufficient to 
convert the charge into a fixed charge.32 
The finance industry responded with an innovation of its own.  In Re New Bullas Trading, the 
draftsman purported to divide the book debts and the proceeds on collection, creating a fixed 
charge over the former and a floating charge over the latter.33  Yet in Brumark the Privy Council 
thought such a distinction made no commercial sense, and that a restriction on disposition which 
nevertheless allowed collection and free use of the proceeds was inconsistent with a fixed charge 
because it allowed the debt and its proceeds to be withdrawn from the security by the act of the 
company collecting it.34  This cast doubt on both Siebe Gorman and New Bullas Trading and the 
matter was finally put to rest in Spectrum Plus Ltd which overruled both cases and determined that 
for a charge over book debts to be a fixed charge the debts must be paid into a sufficiently  blocked 
account on collection.35  In other words, the legislature had developed a scheme for protecting 
corporate bankruptcy’s policy concerns, and the English courts resisted the finance industry’s 
attempts to circumvent that scheme by making all security fixed. 
III The Foundational Question, the US Answer and Secured Transaction Law’s Policy Concerns 
Whilst English law started with a generous attitude to the pervasive floating charge which was to be 
subsequently clawed back by the legislature with regard to corporate bankruptcy law’s policy 
concerns, matters developed almost completely in reverse in the US.  Benedict v Ratner was an early 
twentieth century case concerning an assignment of the debtor's account receivables (book debts 
for the English lawyer).  Prior to default the borrower was entitled to collect the debts and use the 
proceeds as it chose.  No consent was required from the secured party and the debtors were not 
notified of the assignment of their debts. In the Supreme Court Justice Brandeis refused to recognise 
the priority of the lien, saying: 
Under the law of New York a transfer of property which reserves to the transferor the right to 
dispose of the same or to apply the proceeds thereof for his own use is, as to creditors, 
fraudulent in law and void.36 
Following Benedict, the US finance industry developed other devices to mitigate the effects of the 
judgment.37   Yet this gave rise to "a mismatch of complex and interlocking statutes, with intricate 
registration requirements, that lacked overall coherence and uniformity".38  As a result, in 1951 
Article 9 of the UCC (under the auspices of two sponsoring organisations, the American Law Institute 
and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) expressly recommended 
validating security interests where the debtor was free to dispose of the collateral without consent 
(as with inventory) or collect collateral and use the proceeds (as with receivables),39 validating 
                                                            
32 Re Brightlife Ltd [1987] Ch 200; [1987] 2 WLR 197 
33 Re New Bullas Trading Ltd [1994] BCC 36 
34 Brumark Investments Ltd Privy Council (NZ) [2001] 2 AC 710 
35 Spectrum Plus Ltd (in Liquidation) [2005] UKHL 41; [2005] 2 AC 680 
36 Benedict v Ratner 268 U.S. 353 (1925) 
37 J. Getzler, 'The Role of Security over Future and Circulating Capital', 250-251  in Getzler and Payne (n 3) 
38 G. McCormack, Secured Credit Under English and American Law (CUP 2004), 74 
39 UCC 1951 § 9-205(a)  
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contractual provisions for security interests in after-acquired property,40 and giving an automatic 
security interest in proceeds.41  
The American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners are not legislatures.  For 
their recommendations to take effect it was necessary for individual states to adopt them, and UCC 
Article 9 was not widely adopted until further revisions in 1962.  Although these revisions made it 
substantially easier to acquire a perfected security interest in assets falling within Article 9 than it 
had been under the common law, it remained challenging for a lender to obtain a security interest 
over substantially all of the assets of the company (what US lawyers and financiers call a "blanket 
lien").  The corporate bankruptcy policy concerns which English law had dealt with by specific 
amendments to insolvency law's distributional order of priority were typically much less acute in the 
US, where secured creditors did not have a blanket lien and debtors continued to have 
unencumbered assets.  Instead, the evolutionary story focuses on successive efforts to deal with 
secured transaction law’s policy concerns for easily perfected security over as wide a range of assets 
as possible in order to promote the availability of affordable capital for healthy companies, 
eventually leading to substantial revisions to Article 9 in 2001.  At the same time, no special 
legislative effort was regarded as necessary to deal with corporate bankruptcy law’s policy concerns 
in an environment in which estates were not fully encumbered: no distinct species of security 
interest was created; and a floating lien was treated in the same way as any other type of security 
interest for the purposes of bankruptcy priority. 
Before 2001, we see the first secured transaction policy concern when we consider the   complex, 
and frequently litigated, perfection requirements in US secured transactions law.   Section 544(a) of 
the US Bankruptcy Code (the so-called "strong arm" clause) affords the bankruptcy trustee or debtor 
in possession the status of a hypothetical judicial lien creditor, entitling him to avoid security 
interests that are unperfected at the commencement of the bankruptcy.  Most security interests are 
perfected by the filing of a financing statement, but both the place of filing rules and the description 
requirements under Article 9 have traditionally been notoriously challenging.  “Old” Article 9’s place 
of filing rules turned on the category of asset over which security was taken, and there are over 
4,000 filing systems in the US, divided not only into state filing systems but also into different county 
filing systems.42   Relatively complex steps were required to maintain perfection where the proceeds 
of collateral were invested in assets of a different type from the original collateral, and the complex 
place of filing rules meant that if the collateral or the borrower changed location to a new state it 
was easy enough for the secured party to fail to make new filings which were required by the filing 
rules.  Furthermore, secured creditors were required to set out in the financing statement each 
category of collateral separately.  Thus it was comparatively difficult to take a “blanket lien”, and it 
was not unusual for a financier to discover that a significant portion of the collateral package had not 
been properly perfected.  As a result, unencumbered assets were frequently available to support 
corporate bankruptcy policy concerns, but reformers were concerned that these complex perfection 
requirements undermined secured transaction policy considerations, with damaging implications for 
the availability and cost of credit for healthy companies in the economy. 
                                                            
40 UCC 1951 § 9-204 
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42 See L.R. Lupica, ‘The Impact of Revised Article 9‘ (2005) 93 Ky. L.J. 867, 887 for the old system and L. LoPucki 
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It is in this context that the perfection requirements were the subject of significant reform in the 
amendments to Article 9 which came into force in 2001.43  First, the 2001 amendments relaxed the 
description requirements, so that a more limited list of information now needs to be correctly 
reflected in order for the security interest to be perfected.44  Moreover, for the first time it became 
possible to state simply that the security interest was in "all assets", making it significantly less likely 
that there would be an error in the description of the collateral.45  The “place of filing” rules were 
also significantly simplified so that all financing statements were required to be filed in the state 
where the borrower is located.46   Thus, overall it has become less likely that the unsecured creditor 
will be able to rely on secured creditor error to carve out a portion of unencumbered assets, and the 
overall regime has moved towards supporting a policy objective of easily perfected security in order 
to encourage lending at a good price in the “normal” economy.  At the same time, it is less likely that 
there will be unencumbered assets in the corporate bankruptcy case if the debtor fails. 
A further limitation on taking full security over all assets under “old” Article 9 was the exclusion of 
certain types of assets from its scope.  Although security could be taken over most of these assets at 
common law, this was a complex exercise which did not facilitate security grants in a range of 
valuable assets, with all of the concerns for credit availability and cost which that gives rise to.  Once 
again, then, the evolutionary history has been concerned with this secured transaction policy 
concern, rather than the corporate bankruptcy policy concerns which could already be addressed 
using the unencumbered assets in many estates.  Thus, when new categories of collateral were 
added to Article 9 in 2001, it made the process of taking security over them more straightforward.   
These new categories include health-care insurance receivables,47 commercial tort claims,48 and 
deposit accounts.49  Historically, Article 9 of the UCC did not apply to most security interests in 
deposit accounts (although some states did make non-uniform amendments to state law to bring 
deposit accounts within Article 9).50    The 2001 revisions, however, extended Article 9 to include 
security interests in non-consumer deposit accounts.51   The common law requirements for deposit 
accounts presented real practical impediments to the taking of security over an account used in day-
to-day operations, so that this represents a particularly significant extension.52   Notably, the method 
of perfection for deposit accounts is different.  Instead of filing a financing statement, it is necessary 
for the secured creditor to have "control" established in one of three ways.  First, if the secured 
party is the bank that maintains the deposit account, then control and hence perfection is 
automatic.53  Secondly, if the borrower, the secured party and the bank agree in a "control 
                                                            
43 Preparatory work for the Study Committee for these reforms started in the autumn of 1989, finishing in 
1999 with the revisions coming into effect in 1 July 2001 
44 UCC §9-506(a) 
45 UCC §9-504(2) 
46 UCC §9-103(1) 
47 UCC §9-102(a)(2) & §9-102(a)(46) 
48 UCC §9-102(a)(13) 
49 UCC §9-102(a)(29) 
50 G.R. Warner, 'The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy' (2001) 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev 3, 
45 fn 238 citing B Clark, 'Revised Article 9 of the U.C.C.: Scope, Perfection, Priorities and Default' (2000) 4 N.C. 
Banking Inst. 129, 134 and B. Markell, 'From Property to Contract and Back: An Examination of Deposit 
Accounts and Revised Article 9' (1998-2000) 74 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 963, 968-969 
51 UCC §9-109 
52 D.L. Greene, 'Deposit Accounts as Bank Loan Collateral Beyond Setoff to Perfection – The Common Law is 
Alive and Well' (1990) 39 Drake L. Rev. 259 cited in S.L. Harris and C.W. Mooney, Jr., 'How Successful Was the 
Revision of UCC Article 9? Reflections of the Reporters' 74 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 1357, 1368 fn 48 
53 UCC §9-104(a)(1) 
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agreement" that the bank will comply with the secured party's instructions to pay out the funds in 
the deposit account without further consent by the debtor, then the control requirements will be 
satisfied.54  Finally, the control requirement will be met if the borrower becomes the bank's 
customer with respect to the account.55  Crucially, there is no need to maintain day-to-day operating 
control of the account to obtain priority.  Section 9-104(b) of the UCC provides that a secured party 
that has satisfied the minimum requirements for control (such as entering into a control agreement) 
is perfected by control, "even if the debtor retains the right to direct the disposition of funds from 
the deposit account."  Perfection of a security interest in a deposit account is thus now a relatively 
straightforward matter, once again supporting a policy move towards blanket liens to encourage 
availability and pricing of credit, and reducing the likelihood of unencumbered assets to support any 
corporate bankruptcy case. 
A further policy question for secured transactions law is the extent to which a security interest 
should attach to assets coming into the estate after commencement of the bankruptcy case.  In 
English law the floating charge continues to attach to property within the scope of the charge 
coming into the estate after an insolvency filing.  In contrast, the usual rule in US bankruptcy is that a 
pre-petition security interest cannot reach property that comes into the estate after the bankruptcy 
petition,56 other than “proceeds, products, offspring, profits or rent" of the pre-petition collateral.57  
At the time the Bankruptcy Code was enacted, the definition of "proceeds" in Article 9 of the UCC 
was relatively limited, so that once again a pot of assets was likely to exist which fell outside the 
scope of the security package.   However, this can be a serious limitation for a secured creditor 
relying on the debtor’s receivables as a, or even the, principal asset class in its security package.  The 
2001 reforms appear to have recognised this issue and apply the concept of proceeds to future 
property that is generated by or related to the original collateral.  It must be admitted, though, that 
spirited debate has followed in the US as to whether this amounts to a clarification of the original 
position or whether it amounts to an expansion of the proceeds concept.  
When a debtor commingles cash proceeds with other monies standing to the credit of a bank 
account, Article 9 provides that the secured party can continue to assert a security interest in the 
monies standing to the credit of the bank account using “a method of tracing, including application 
of equitable principles, that is permitted under non-UCC law with respect to the type of collateral”.58  
Insofar as cash proceeds are concerned, ordinarily the “lowest intermediate balance rule” has the 
result that the amount of the secured creditor’s collateral in the monies standing to the credit of the 
account is equal to the lowest balance of all funds in the account between the time the collateral 
was deposited and the time the tracing rule is applied.  Historically, in bankruptcy this rule has been 
limited to cash proceeds received by the borrower within ten days before the institution of the 
bankruptcy proceedings.  However, the revised UCC eliminates the difficult to apply insolvency 
tracing rules, and provides for the continuation of a security interest in identifiable cash proceeds.  
Overall, it appears once again that the reforms to the proceeds rules are motivated by secured 
transaction law’s policy concern for the scope and value of the security package in order to 
                                                            
54 UCC §9-104(a)(2) 
55 UCC §9-104(a)(3).  For a detailed exploration of the requirements, see B. Markell, 'From Property to Contract 
and Back: An Examination of Deposit Accounts and Revised Article 9' (1998-2000) 74 Chi-Kent L Rev. 963,  984-
987 
56 11 U.S.C. §552(a) 
57 11 U.S.C. §552(a) and (b).  For a discussion see L.M. LoPucki,  A.I. Abraham and B.P. Delahaye, 'Optimising 
English and American Security Interests' (2012-2013) 88 Notre Dame L. Rev 1785, 1828 and G.R. Warner, 'The 
Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy' (2001) 9 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 3,  525 
58 UCC §9-315(b) 
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encourage lending to healthy companies.  And once again the reforms reduce the likelihood of 
unencumbered assets. 
The evolutionary histories of English and American secured transaction laws also differ with respect 
to the sale of book debts.  American secured transactions law regards sales of book debts as the 
functional equivalent of a security interest, and broadly treats the two types of transaction in the 
same way, whilst English law takes a more formalistic approach.  Before the 2001 revisions, Article 9 
reflected a strong policy commitment to free assignability and provided that contractual anti-
assignment clauses in accounts and general intangibles for money due or to become due were 
ineffective.59  However, it applied only to sales of what were called chattel paper, instruments or 
accounts.  Essentially, this meant that only sales of goods and service related rights fell within Article 
9's scope. Homer Kripke had suggested in the 1960s that this was a mistake,60  and revised Article 9 
expanded the scope of the provision to include “payment intangibles” defined as “general 
intangible[s] under which the account debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”61  In 
essence, this was intended to capture payment streams arising otherwise than out of a sale or 
disposal of goods.  Moreover, revised Article 9 relaxed many statutory and contractual restrictions 
on asset transfers.62  In their review of the revisions Steven Harris and Charles Mooney (Reporters 
for the Drafting Committee to Revised Uniform Commercial Code Article 9) go so far as to say, "The 
revised Article overrides virtually all contractual and legal restrictions to the creation, attachment 
and perfection of security interests in intangibles."63  Once again, the overall effect is to make it 
more likely that all of the company's assets will be validly encumbered, and thus to support secured 
transaction policy concerns. 
This overall shift towards more readily facilitating the blanket lien has also had implications for the 
funding of the corporate bankruptcy case in the US.  US Chapter 11 provides that a debtor which 
seeks to use cash which is the subject of a security interest granted to a creditor requires either the 
consent of that creditor or the consent of the court.  Court consent will only be given if the court is 
satisfied that the creditor has been provided with "adequate protection" of its security interest.  
Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code provides a non-exclusive list of methods for providing adequate 
protection: (i) cash payments, (ii) replacement security, or (iii) other protection that will result in the 
realisation of the "indubitable equivalent" of the secured creditor's interest in the property.  The 
2001 revisions to the UCC have an impact on the operation of these bankruptcy provisions in two 
ways.  First, it is more likely that cash within the estate will be validly secured in favour of the 
secured creditor, so that section 361 is engaged.  Secondly, it is more likely that all of the bankruptcy 
estate's assets will fall within the security package, so that the debtor will find it very difficult to 
meet the adequate protection requirements.  The practical consequence is to deliver the secured 
creditor control of the case through effective control of the cash in the estate.64 
Famously, section 364 of Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code permits the distressed company to 
obtain financing after it has petitioned for Chapter 11 on either an unsecured basis or, after notice 
and a hearing, in exchange for priority (so-called DIP financing).  Priority may be (i) a super-priority 
administrative claim, ranking after existing secured lenders, (ii) a secured claim in unencumbered 
                                                            
59 Former UCC §9-318(4) 
60 H. Kripke, 'Suggestions for Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds and Priorities' (1966) 41 NYUL Rev. 687, 
690-93 
61 UCC §9-102(61) 
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property, (iii) a junior secured claim, or (iv) a senior secured claim which takes priority over, or 
"primes", pre-petition senior secured creditors.  This regime has the benefit of an express statutory 
scheme and a depth of guidance through judicial decision-making which compares favourably with 
the uncertain position in English law, and in the 1990s a broad market for specialist rescue finance 
developed in the US.  However, the DIP finance market has been in decline in the US.65  Doubtless 
this is partly in response to the retreat of many traditional lenders from areas of business hit by 
post-financial crisis regulatory reform, but the UCC reforms may also have had an impact.  Although 
it is possible to prime existing security interests, this appears to be difficult to achieve, first because 
it requires the debtor to show that no other financing is available, and secondly because it requires 
that the interests of pre-petition secured creditors that would be primed by the new facility are 
adequately protected.  Indeed, Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren state that, “Granting senior liens 
to post-petition lenders is not a common occurrence.”66  Instead, the original market for so-called 
DIP financing appeared to rely on a pool of unencumbered assets to act as collateral for the new 
loan.  Once again, as the UCC reforms make it more likely that there will be no free assets, it 
becomes less likely that a third party financier will be interested in financing the case.  Instead, in 
some cases (though by no means all) secured creditors have used the DIP financing as a way to 
further protect their position, notably through what is known as "roll-up."  When a DIP loan is rolled 
up, existing secured creditors provide the DIP loan on the condition that it is used to repay the pre-
bankruptcy loan.  This ensures that any remaining concerns about the pre-bankruptcy security 
package are dealt with as the original loan is "rolled-up" into the DIP financing.67  Thus, in mediating 
between secured transaction law’s concern for the availability and cost of credit for healthy 
companies and corporate bankruptcy law’s concern for the financing of the bankruptcy case in order 
to maximise recoveries, the balance appears to be tipped towards secured transaction law’s policy 
concerns. 
IV  The Institutional Environment 
Thus far, we have seen that English law facilitated the taking of security over all or substantially all of 
a debtor’s assets by the end of the nineteenth century, so that legislative efforts largely focused on 
the corporate bankruptcy policy concerns which arise as a result, whilst the US Uniform Commercial 
Code and the state legislatures have been much slower to facilitate the taking of a so-called “blanket 
lien”, with the result that reform efforts have focused on secured transaction law’s policy concerns 
in supporting the availability and cost of credit in the healthy economy.  However, this does not give 
a full picture.  In each jurisdiction, a complex institutional environment has developed around 
corporate bankruptcy which further influences the balance between secured transaction law’s policy 
concerns, on the one hand, and corporate bankruptcy law’s policy concerns, on the other. 
In England, accountants expert in insolvency began actively to support creditors in corporate 
bankruptcy from the middle of the nineteenth century,68 and by the end of the first world war 
leading practitioners had developed a business of reorganising distressed businesses and selling 
them off to a new purchaser on behalf of the creditors, or where that was not possible auctioning 
the assets.69  By the mid-1950s this was normally achieved by appointing the insolvency practitioner 
                                                            
65 ABI Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11 Final Report, 75 fn 296 
66 LoPucki and Warren, Secured Credit (n 42), 517 
67 See M.J. Roe and F. Tung, 'Breaking Bankruptcy Policy: How Rent-Seeking Upends the Creditors Bargain' 
(2013) 99:12 Virginia Law Review 1235 
68 E. Jones, True and Fair: A History of Price Waterhouse (Hamish Hamilton 1995), 10 
69 K. Cork, Cork on Cork (Macmillan 1988), 10 
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as a receiver.  Kenneth Cork (one of the leading practitioners of his day) provides a pithy description 
of this role in the context of the English secured transaction regime in his autobiography: 
“… a receiver … was invariably a Chartered Accountant (though the law did not say he should 
be) appointed in most cases by a bank who had lent a large sum of money to a company on 
the security of its assets (a “floating charge”) and on calling in the debt was told the 
company could not pay.  At the time of the loan the bank received from the company a 
debenture which gave repayment of the loan priority over any other debts in the event of 
the company becoming insolvent.  It was called the debenture holder, and it had the power 
to appoint a receiver if the debt was called and not repaid.   
 The receiver so appointed, as English law prescribed, had dictatorial powers to 
accomplish one thing and one thing only: to extract from the stricken company by any 
means it could enough money to pay the ‘preferential creditors’ as defined by law … , the 
debenture holder and his own costs.  Once he had discharged that duty, he withdrew.”70 
This system underwent two significant reforms but the idea of secured creditor power which was 
explicit in the duties owed in the receivership regime was, in reality, retained implicitly in the new 
regime.  In 2002 the Enterprise Act largely abolished receivership and significantly reformed the 
administration procedure  (which had been introduced into English law in 1986 to be used either 
where there was a floating charge but the debenture holder did not want to appoint a receiver, or 
where there was no floating charge enabling a receiver to be appointed).  Two routes are prescribed 
for appointing an administrator.  The first is appointment by the court on an application by the 
company, the directors of the company or one or more of the creditors.71  The second is an out-of-
court appointment by the holder of a qualifying floating charge (essentially the holder of a floating 
charge which, together with any fixed charges, secures all or substantially all of the company's 
property),72  the company or its directors.73   Crucially, however, the qualifying floating charge holder 
is given the power to control the identity of the administrator in each route.74  Administrators 
continue to be repeat players in the market, and this appointment power provides considerable soft 
incentives to comply with the wishes of the floating charge holder,75 whilst the legislative scheme 
largely protects the administrator's commercial decisions by making them susceptible to challenge 
only on rationality grounds.76  Thus, although it may be the case that administrators have the power 
to raise new financing for the case which ranks ahead of the pre-administration floating charge, or to 
use floating charge assets without consent, in reality they have little incentive to do so.  The position 
is different in liquidation, but a qualifying floating charge holder is likely to be able to veto 
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liquidation by appointing an administrator, and recent reforms which expand the power of the 
administrator to distribute proceeds make it increasingly unlikely that the company will be placed 
into liquidation at all.   
The courts have supported the overall scheme  by firmly indicating, with one exception, that the 
insolvency practitioner is the guardian of commercial decision-making for the corporate bankruptcy 
case, 77 and remaining extremely reluctant to interfere in the administrator’s decisions as a result.  
Thus, typically, an administrator will pay high regard to the wishes of the secured creditor, and this 
provides the secured creditor with considerable “soft” power in rebalancing the trade-off between 
secured transaction policy concerns and corporate bankruptcy policy concerns which would 
otherwise be achieved.  Notably, the one area in which the courts have shown themselves 
somewhat willing to interfere in the administrator’s decision-making is where the administrator has 
rode rough shod over the secured creditor’s wishes.  In Clydesdale this resulted in the successful 
removal of the administrator, notwithstanding that fact that David Richards J. (as he then was) had 
not determined that there had been any wrong doing,78 and in Capitol Films Richard Snowden Q.C. 
(as he then was) ordered an administrator who had sought the court’s consent to a sale of assets 
subject to a fixed charge (under paragraph 71 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986) to pay 
costs on the application, commenting that whilst “the court will generally defer to the commercial 
judgment of the office- holders where what is in issue is a challenge to the office-holder’s 
assessment of the merits of one particular bid for a company’s assets over another”, a paragraph 71 
application “requires the court to balance the competing rights and interests of the holders of fixed 
charges with the rights and interests of other creditors” and that “On that type of issue, the court 
does not simply … defer to the administrators’ business judgment provided that it is rational, the 
court will decide for itself how to resolve the interests of creditors.”79  In Capitol Films Snowden Q.C. 
firmly decided the case in the secured creditor's favour. 
The institutional environment of corporate bankruptcy in the United States has evolved in a 
strikingly different way.   Yet the institutional environment enables some protection of corporate 
bankruptcy's re-distributional  policy concerns vis-à-vis secured creditors, notwithstanding the 
priority of the secured creditor in the corporate bankruptcy statute, just as the institutional 
environment in England facilitates some protection of secured creditor interests notwithstanding 
the focus on re-distributional policy concerns in the English corporate bankruptcy statute.  In other 
words, the institutional environment in each jurisdiction is an essential part of the overall balance 
struck between secured transaction policy concerns and corporate bankruptcy policy concerns.  The 
most significant aspect of this institutional environment in the United States is the central role 
afforded to the court in the US scheme when compared with the English scheme, right from the start 
of modern US bankruptcy in 1898.  The 1898 Bankruptcy Act in the United States gave the court, and 
not the creditors, the power to appoint a trustee or trustees to administer the estate,80 who was 
usually a lawyer.  A powerful bankruptcy bar emerged, rather than an insolvency profession of 
accountants with essentially a business focus.81 The central role of the court was reinforced by 
reform in the 1930s,82 and firmly entrenched in modern US bankruptcy in the form of the 1978 US 
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Bankruptcy Code.83  What emerges in the US is a system which affords considerable discretion to the 
bankruptcy judge,84 who typically performs a far more interventionist role than we are used to in 
England. 
This institutional structure has been crucial in the US for balancing the relatively unassailable 
position of the secured creditor  at the top of corporate bankruptcy's distributional tree, with 
corporate bankruptcy policy’s concerns for unsecured creditors, funding of the case and maximising 
recoveries, as secured transactions law has moved steadily closer to supporting blanket security.  
Thus, the US bankruptcy courts have shown themselves creative in limiting the reach of secured 
claims into proceeds where necessary to preserve cash for the estate.  Sometimes the court has 
been able to arrive at what it views as the right result as a matter of interpreting the security 
contract to determine precisely what is within its scope.85  Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren 
recount how, prior to the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, several courts had “reached 
the somewhat surprising conclusion that the bill paid by customers of a hotel when they checked out 
was the “account” arising out of a sale of services, rather than “rent” for the use of the hotel 
room.”86  It will be recalled that section 552 of the Bankruptcy Code permits secured creditors to 
trace the value of its collateral into products, offspring, rents or profits, as well as into proceeds.  
Thus, by concluding that the hotel receipts were not rent, the debtor was free to use the revenue to 
fund the case (or to provide adequate protection or security to other funders).  In 1994 Congress 
amended section 552 specifically to clarify that a security interest could extend to room charges.  
But the authors tell us that a ninth circuit court “casually sidesteps the amendment by interpreting it 
to mean only the net room revenues, after allowing the debtor to pay the expenses necessary to 
stay in business and complete the reorganization.”87 
Furthermore, section 552(b) of Chapter 11 specifically authorises the court to limit the reach of the 
proceeds security interest "based on the equities of the case",88  and so in appropriate cases the US 
bankruptcy court, as a court of equity, may choose to limit the scope of the proceeds rule.  The 
Bankruptcy Code does not define "equities of the case", and there appears to be relatively little case 
law on the point.  Interestingly, the recent American Bankruptcy Institute Commission which has 
studied reform of Chapter 11 has suggested that the paucity of cases may be because trustees 
frequently agree to waive their right to assert a section 552(b) claim in return for post-petition 
finance from a secured creditor, or the use of cash collateral.89  The fact, therefore, that a Court 
which is known to be activist has discretion to limit the proceeds to which the security interest 
attaches may provide negotiating leverage to the debtor team to raise finance. 
LoPucki, Abraham and Delahaye also report that although US bankruptcy law does not have an 
express carve-out for unsecured creditors from secured creditor proceeds: 
A few American bankruptcy courts have imposed such a carve-out informally, as a condition of 
bankruptcy relief in cases the filing of which might not otherwise have been appropriate.90 
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There is further evidence of the bankruptcy judges insisting that secured creditors meet the 
expenses of the case against the counterfactual of dismissing the Chapter 11 case, and leaving it to 
the secured creditor to enforce in numerous different states, or of the trustee bargaining for such a 
carve-out in return for giving up the equities of the case exception referred to above, or the right 
under section 506 of the Bankruptcy Code to assert that certain costs and expenses are associated 
with the collateral and should be met out of it.91  The point here is that the US Bankruptcy Code 
provides secured creditors in the US with a mechanism for foreclosing against security nationwide, 
without incurring the costs and complexities of enforcing in each State using non-bankruptcy law.92  
In these circumstances, both the bankruptcy judge and the trustee have quite a bit of leverage in 
persuading secured creditors to give up just a little upside for the benefit of the case, particularly 
because there is lively debate in the U.S. about whether a Chapter 11 case should be dismissed if it 
only benefits the secured creditor.93  As Charles Mooney puts it, “Commentators have noted that in 
a secured creditor bankruptcy the secured creditor may be required to ‘pay to play’ – i.e. to carve 
out of its collateral funds for the benefit of general unsecured creditors.”94   
What emerges, then, is a complex picture.  In England, legislative reform efforts focus on corporate 
bankruptcy’s policy concerns, but secured creditors receive support for their interests through an 
institutional structure comprised of an insolvency profession which takes the commercial decisions 
in the case and which has incentives to pay high regard to their wishes, and a non-interventionist 
court.  In the US, the efforts of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 
reflected in state legislation, is focused on promoting secured transaction policy, but a powerful and 
interventionist specialist bankruptcy court pays high regard to corporate bankruptcy policy concerns 
in the conduct of the corporate bankruptcy case.  This brings us to the final question for this article: 
what does the evolutionary analysis mean for current reform efforts? 
V Some tentative predictions for the reasonably forseeable  future  
Both England and America have been reflecting recently on whether the current balance between 
secured transaction and corporate bankruptcy policy concerns has been appropriately struck.  Not 
surprisingly, given the different evolutionary paths trodden in each jurisdiction, in England this has 
focused on whether too many inroads have been made into secured creditor priority, whilst in the 
US it has focused on whether recent reforms to the Uniform Commercial Code, as reflected in state 
legislation, have gone too far in prioritising concerns for secured credit at the expense of corporate 
bankruptcy’s policy concerns.  The debate in England can be seen in the work of the Secured 
Transactions Law Reform Project,95 and the work of the City of London Law Society Financial Law 
Committee,96 and the debate in the United States can be seen in the report of the recent American 
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Bankruptcy Institute Commission to Study Reform of Chapter 11,97 and the response of the Loan 
Syndications and Trading Association to that Report.98 
The theory of path dependence is clearly visible in our account in this article.99 First, the overall 
system of secured transactions law, corporate bankruptcy distributional priority and institutional 
structure developed in part in both jurisdictions because of initial decisions on the ability of a 
secured creditor to take security over substantially all of a debtor’s assets.  Secondly, as a result of 
these initial decisions, each jurisdiction focused on different aspects of the same policy debate so 
that the rules developed in a different fashion in each jurisdiction.  It is appropriate, then, to see 
what path dependence theory may be able to tell us about future developments.  Path dependence 
theory tells us that once a complicated system has developed, even if that system has developed in 
response to historical issues which are no longer relevant, the system may continue to persist 
because the cost of demolishing it and building an entirely new system may not be regarded as 
worthwhile.100  As Mark Roe puts it, “we resurface, we do not revolutionize”.101  Furthermore, 
incumbent groups may mobilise to block change.102  Given these factors of cost and interest group 
politics  it may not be possible to drive change through unless the system is completely 
unsatisfactory (rather than not the best scheme available).103  Nonetheless, it is possible for there to 
be a shock to the system of sufficient severity that radical change follows, so that (borrowing 
another idea from evolutionary biology) institutional change follows a pattern of “punctuated 
equilibrium” in which “periods of relative stasis give way at “critical junctures” to phases of 
accelerated development”.104  Applying this theory to our evolutionary account, there is reason to 
believe that the conditions are not right in either jurisdiction for a radical overhaul.  
Modern markets have become increasingly specialised, with practitioners and scholars focusing on 
specific areas in which they are expert.  In the reform debate we see those primarily concerned with 
non-distressed capital promoting secured transaction policy concerns, whilst we see those primarily 
concerned with reorganisation and liquidation of distressed companies promoting corporate 
bankruptcy policy concerns, and within each of those fields of practice and study, right thinking 
individuals disagree on the "correct" policy objectives.  Debate rages about how significant 
corporate bankruptcy law is for, and the role which it should play in, capital raising in the healthy 
economy,105  reducing the agency costs associated with debt,106 and protecting vulnerable classes of 
creditor.107  At the same time, as noted at the start of this article, there is a voluminous literature on 
the theoretical case for secured credit to promote the availability of low-cost credit.108  When we 
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analyse the ways in which these issues have been tackled in real-world England and America, we see 
that the process in both jurisdictions has been one of attempting to find some sort of balance 
between all of the policy objectives through a highly complex interplay of secured transaction 
legislation (and federal codes, in the US), corporate bankruptcy legislation and the institutional 
environment in which that legislation operates.  It is probably impossible to test empirically whether 
one jurisdiction does a "better" job of balancing the competing policy objectives than the other, or 
to determine what the "right" balancing point is; what emerges from the account is a process of 
"finding our own way".  Thus, although some changes are more significant than others (the 2001 
reforms to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in the US appear to have been particularly 
significant), in truth all of the changes have been arrived at slowly and incrementally, precisely 
because it is so difficult to find the appropriate point of balance.  In other words, it is arguably not 
sufficiently apparent that either system is completely unsatisfactory so as  to motivate the cost and 
contention of a complete overhaul. 
Indeed, whilst the ABI Commission has suggested several legislative reforms intended to assist in 
tilting the balance away from the secured creditor in the US, all of its suggestions are firmly 
embedded within the existing legal and institutional structure.  First, as we have seen section 552(b) 
of Chapter 11 specifically authorises the court to limit the reach of the proceeds security interest 
"based on the equities of the case",109  and so in appropriate cases the US bankruptcy court, as a 
court of equity, may choose to limit the scope of the proceeds rule.  The ABI report concluded that 
the legislative history indicated that the exception "was intended to compensate the estate for use 
of unencumbered property expenditures that enhanced the value of the secured creditor's lien and 
to protect the rehabilitative purposes of the Bankruptcy Code."110  They recommended that the 
trustee should be able to satisfy the equities of the case exception with evidence of the estate 
contributing value, whether through time, effort, money, property or costs savings,111 and suggested 
that the parties should not be permitted to waive the equities of the case exception in return for 
post-petition financing or use of collateral.112 
Secondly, the ABI report makes several controversial suggestions for legislative reform on the 
question of how to value the secured creditor's collateral.  The value of the collateral is relevant in a 
number of different ways.   First, the secured creditor is only entitled to accrue post-petition 
interest, attorney’s fees or costs on its claim where the value of its collateral exceeds the amount of 
its claim (in other words, where it is over-secured).113  Secondly, where the debtor plans to use the 
secured creditor’s collateral during the bankruptcy case and proposes arrangements which it argues 
“adequately protect” the secured creditor, valuation of the collateral is crucial in determining what 
the secured creditor should be adequately protected for.  Thirdly, it is relevant for the question of 
whether a plan of reorganisation can be confirmed against the secured creditor’s wishes (or 
"crammed down") on the basis that secured creditors are receiving the full amount of their allowed 
secured claims.114  Courts are divided as to the question of when the value to be protected is to be 
assessed,115 and courts are further divided on how to approach the valuation methodology: in other 
words, whether the value to be protected is the value which the secured creditor would get if she 
were to foreclose on the secured assets and sell them (potentially in numerous different states) or 
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whether it is the going concern value of the assets after the reorganisation.116   Furthermore, the 
answer is not necessarily the same in all of the scenarios which we have outlined.117   The ABI Report 
proposes that secured creditors receive adequate protection based on the foreclosure value of their 
collateral, but that the question of whether they have received distributions under a plan of 
reorganisation with a value equal to the value of their allowed secured claim should be determined 
on a going concern basis: arguably a valuation framework firmly tilted in favour of corporate 
bankruptcy policy considerations. 
Even so, there is reason to be doubtful about even these reforms.  The ABI hoped that their report 
would make its way to Congress.   In the event the proximity of the US election at the time that it 
was published meant that that did not come to pass, but it has also been argued elsewhere that 
changes in the market, notably the rise of distressed debt investing and pre-packaged or pre-
arranged Chapter 11 plans which compromise only financial liabilities, have meant that increasing 
secured creditor control in US corporate bankruptcy has not led to increasing losses to priority or 
trade creditors in large cases.118 Consistent with the predictions of path dependency theory for the 
role of interest group politics, the ABI proposals have been vigorously contested by the US Loan 
Syndication and Trading Association.119  Ultimately, it may be that a sufficiently compelling case has 
not been made out to motivate Congress to commit serious legislative time to bankruptcy reform.  
In England, on the other hand, legislative time is likely to be at a premium as a result of the decision 
of the British people to leave the European Union on 23 June 2016.   Once again, it seems unlikely 
that the issues discussed in this article will be seen as priorities in a challenging legislative timetable.  
Nonetheless, it may be that the process of small and incremental adjustments to the balance 
between the competing policy objectives will continue on a more modest scale, even if a radical 
prescription for a completely new system is not written. 
Taking England first, one area in which the balance might be thought to have tipped too far is in the 
area of corporate bankruptcy expenses.  Until the Enterprise Act 2002 reforms, administration 
expenses broadly fell into one of three categories under section 19 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  The 
first of these was post administration liabilities incurred by or on behalf of the administrator for the 
benefit of the administration; the second was post-administration liabilities which it would be 
inequitable not to pay (for example, because a creditor's property was being used at that creditor's 
expense to further the purpose of the administration for the benefit of all creditors); and the last 
was those expenses which statute imposed upon the company in administration or the office holder 
in such a way as to give priority as an expense for policy reasons, such as certain tax liabilities.120  The 
approach in liquidation was different and was to be found in Insolvency Rule 4.218.  In 2002, when 
administrators were given the power to distribute assets so that all administrations would no longer 
necessarily be followed by liquidation, Insolvency Rule 2.67 was introduced to align the 
administration expenses position with the position on liquidation.  However, the rules were not 
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perfectly aligned.  In fact, the new Insolvency Rule 2.67 seemed to be a slightly curious mix of the 
ancien administration regime and the approach in liquidation. 
Judicial clarification has followed slowly, and uncertainties remain.  Pillar Denton told us that the 
equitable principle known as the Lundy Granite principle (that a claim which would otherwise have 
been provable as an ordinary unsecured claim in the administration should be elevated to be treated 
as if it is an expense because it would be inequitable not to do so) had survived subsequent 
legislative interventions. 121   The principal example of a claim falling into this category would be rent 
payable in respect of a period of beneficial occupation of a leasehold property by the company in 
administration, but there is still uncertainty as to whether a number of liabilities would fall within 
the principle or not.  For example, there is some doubt as to whether dilapidations claims (claims for 
damage to the property arising before or during the administration), service charge liabilities or 
claims for partial occupation fall within the principle or do not.  
In the Nortel administration the Supreme Court provided guidance on the meaning of "necessary 
disbursement" for the purposes of Insolvency Rule 2.67.122  Lord Neuberger suggested two 
circumstances (whilst caveating that it would be dangerous to treat his formulation as an absolute 
rule) in which a liability is a necessary disbursement.  The first was where a liability arose out of 
something done in the administration (normally by the administrator or on the administrator's 
behalf), and the second was a liability imposed by a statute, "whose terms render it clear that the 
liability to make the disbursement falls on an administrator as part of the administration."   
However, once again this gives rise to a number of uncertainties.  First, what is meant by something 
"done in the administration"?  For example, where the administrator does something which gives 
rise to a tax liability, should the tax liability be treated as an expense?  Secondly, how easy is it to 
determine, simply by looking at a statute, whether a liability has been imposed on the administrator 
as part of the administration?  Consider, for example, section 22 of the Environment Protection Act 
1990: 
 
It is an offence for a person to deposit controlled waste or extractive waste or knowingly cause 
or knowingly permit controlled waste to be deposited in/on land without an environmental 
permit or to treat, keep or dispose of controlled waste in a manner likely to cause pollution of 
the environment or harm to human health. 
 
Many statutory liabilities for environmental protection make clear that they do not fall on insolvency 
practitioners, but there is no express carve-out for insolvency practitioners in section 22 of the EPA, 
so that it is not clear whether the EPA "imposes a liability on the administrator" or not.  Thus there 
are two risks for the floating charge holder: first, the general risk of subordination to the costs and 
expenses of the proceeding and, second, the potential for the costs and expenses to be swelled by 
claims which have not been in the contemplation of the courts before, so they cannot be quantified 
and priced ex ante. At the time of writing, a major exercise to modernise England's insolvency rules 
has just been completed. Initially there was an expectation that this exercise would include 
clarification of the position on expenses but ultimately a decision appears to have been taken that 
this would be too challenging within the time frame for the project, and the matter accordingly rests 
with the courts.  This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs for domestic lenders, but raises even 
greater challenges for the successful importing of capital.  This is a technical issue for secondary 
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legislation on which the English insolvency legal profession should be able to provide a great deal of 
help, and it may be that it can be implemented even in the absence of a substantial revision of the 
system as a whole. 
Secondly, it is tentatively suggested that England will resist the temptation to deal with each 
emerging priority challenge by creating new classes of preferential debt.    At the time of writing the 
Law Commission has reported on its study of the protection of retail consumer deposits and gift 
vouchers by recommending a new class of preferential debt.123  The global trend has been in the 
other direction; reducing the number of claims which benefit from the rather blunt tool of 
preferential status in the insolvency hierarchy, and it is suggested here that there will be a 
reluctance to buck this trend without a thorough overhaul of the system. Thirdly, the ability (or not) 
of the administrator to raise financing for the case ranking ahead of the floating charge may yet 
benefit from legislative clarification.  Responses to a recent consultation by the Insolvency Service 
(the executive agency responsible for insolvency in England and Wales) on reform to the English 
insolvency system revealed different views on this issue from highly experienced and knowledgeable 
market participants,124 with implications for the advice which secured lenders to healthy companies 
receive and their ability to price credit ex ante.   And finally, the current reform debate may lead 
England to consider again whether the factors for determining whether a charge is fixed or floating 
are too complex, raising the cost of secured transactions in the healthy economy unnecessarily and 
whether an alternative formulation might be found.  It is not possible to expand on the range of 
possibilities in the time and space available here, but industry papers have begun to consider 
possible approaches to the question.125  Overall, the prediction is that England will  continue to 
reassess the extent to which the balance struck between secured transaction policy concerns and 
corporate bankruptcy policy concerns has tipped too far one way or the other, but will rebalance 
slowly and incrementally, and with an awareness of those reforms fit into our overall institutional 
environment, rather than by a radical overhaul of the entire system. 
Similarly, even if the ABI proposals are never taken any further, a number of levers remain in the US 
scheme, taken as a whole, which can be pulled in favour of altering the balance between secured 
transaction policy and corporate bankruptcy policy.  First, and crucially, Article 9 of the UCC still does 
not cover all types of collateral.  Notably, real estate collateral, and some types of intellectual and 
foreign collateral fall outside its scope.  This means that the borrower may still have assets in which 
a secured creditor does not have a perfected security interest.  Moreover, it remains common in the 
US for borrowers to bargain for certain collateral to be excluded from the grant of the security 
interest on the basis that the costs of perfection exceed the benefit.    
Secondly, as Ray Warner has pointed out, there is a question as to whether US bankruptcy courts are 
obliged to use the UCC definition of proceeds.126  As we have seen this is important as a result of the 
new definition of proceeds in modern Article 9-102(64) (c).  Lynn LoPucki and Elizabeth Warren note 
that in 1996 the eleventh circuit held (whilst noting that the fifth and the ninth circuit had gone the 
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other way) that the bankruptcy court was not obliged to apply the UCC concept of proceeds as to 
conclude otherwise would be to accord state lawmakers authority to set definitions for federal 
law.127 When Ray Warner reviewed the position in 2011 it appeared that US bankruptcy courts were 
adopting the revised Article 9 definition of proceeds,128 and the American Bankruptcy Institute Final 
Report into Reform of Chapter 11 declined to propose a federal definition.129  But it must remain the 
case that future courts could seek to draw a distinction, and the point may yet make it to the 
Supreme Court.   
Thirdly, we have already seen that, even without legislative reform prohibiting waiver of the 
“equities of the case” exception, the very existence of the exception provides negotiating leverage 
which itself can result in some rebalancing.  Further, although perfection is a more straightforward 
matter following the UCC reforms, it is still not entirely straightforward.  Bankruptcy trustees 
continue to show they are willing to litigate the issue of perfection, and to plead errors in the 
financing statement, and the courts have shown themselves willing to entertain such claims.  Indeed, 
one commentator has noted 
“There is a dangerous trend toward holding secured creditors to more stringent standards with 
respect to perfection.  In re EDM Corporation 431 B.R. 459 (8th Cir. BAP 2010), is as instructive as 
it is scary.  In that case, the creditors’ UCC-1 financing statement accurately recited the debtor’s 
name, except that it also included a DBA.  The court held that such an alteration was enough to 
render the statement “seriously misleading”.”130    
Thus the threat of a challenge to perfection remains both a negotiating lever in reaching an 
accommodation with the secured creditor, and a route by which the interventionist US bankruptcy 
court can potentially carve assets out of the security package.   
Finally, and arguably most importantly of all, the extensive power of the bankruptcy judge in the 
conduct of the case, and the instructions and advice which may be handed down in judge's 
chambers, provide capacity for the balance of the US regime between secured transaction policy 
concerns and corporate bankruptcy policy concerns to be carefully adjusted on an ongoing basis.  
Overall, even without legislative reform, it is argued that there is plenty of capacity in the US system 
to continue the process of balancing the policy concerns. 
VI Conclusion 
This article has sought to make a contribution to current debate on the shape of reform of secured 
creditor priority in England and the US.  By undertaking a detailed analysis of the evolutionary 
history it has shown how nineteenth century English courts adopted a permissive approach to 
security over substantially all of a debtor’s assets, with the result that legislative reform efforts 
focused on the corporate bankruptcy policy concerns which arose in the absence of unencumbered 
assets, whilst the US Supreme Court adopted a more restrictive approach to blanket liens, with the 
result that reform efforts in the US have focused on secured transaction law’s policy concerns in 
promoting available capital at a good price for non-distressed companies in the economy.  It has also 
analysed how a complex institutional environment developed in each jurisdiction which responds to, 
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and contributes to, the overall balance struck between the policy concerns.  Applying the theory of 
path dependence to the analysis, the article concludes by arguing that both England and the US are 
likely to proceed, at least for the reasonably forseeable future, by cautious and incremental tilts in 
the balance between secured transaction policy and corporate bankruptcy policy concerns, rather 
than dramatic shifts, adapted to and embedded within the complex local and legal institutional 
environment which has developed.  Thus the article finishes with some relatively modest, tentative 
predictions as to how this might be achieved in England and the US. 
 
